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A CAUSERIE ON LAWYERS' ETHICS IN
NEGOTIATION
Alvin B. Rubin*
I asked him whether, as a moralist, he did not think that the
practice of the law, in some degree, hurt the nice feeling of hon-
esty. JOHNSON: 'Why no, sir, if you act properly. You are not to
deceive your clients with false representations of your opinion:
you are not to tell lies to a judge.' 2 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON
47 (G.B. Hill ed. 1934).
The philosopher of Mermaid Tavern did not discuss the morality
expected when lawyers deal with other lawyers or with laymen. When
a lawyer buys or sells a house or a horse or a used car, he is expected
to bargain. When he becomes a Secretary of State - like Dean Ache-
son or John Foster Dulles - or a Governor, or a Senator, or a Con-
gressman or a legislator, he will negotiate and compromise.
In such activities lawyers may be acting for themselves as princi-
pals, or they may be representing constituents. But they are not
practicing their profession as attorneys-at-law. It may be assumed
that the lawyer who is buying or selling a farm on his own behalf is
expected to behave no differently from any other member of his
society, that no special ethical principles command his adherence or
govern his conduct. And while the lawyer-diplomat or lawyer-
politician may conceive of himself as a professional, rather than as
an amateur, he will not be practicing a profession, as that term is
generally understood.
When the lawyer turns to his law practice and begins to represent
his clients as attorney or advocate, he assumes the role of a profes-
sional. What constitutes a profession is difficult to define comprehen-
sively, but all attempts include reference to a store of special training,
knowledge, and skills and to the adoption of ethical standards gov-
erning the manner in which these should be employed. When acting
as an advocate, the lawyer professes a complex set of ethical princi-
ples that regulate his conduct toward the courts, his own clients,
other lawyers and their clients.
Litigation spawns compromise, and courtroom lawyers engage
almost continually in settlement discussions in civil cases and plea
bargains in criminal cases. We do not know what proportion of civil
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claims is settled by negotiation before the filing of suit, but it must
be vastly greater than the number of cases actually filed. Neither
does institution of suit mean an end to negotiations; 91% of all cases
filed in the United States District Courts for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1974 were disposed of prior to the beginning of a trial on the
merits, most of them by some sort of negotiated compromise. In the
same year only 15% of the defendants in criminal cases in the federal
courts went to trial; 61% of the charges terminated in pleas of guilty
or nolo contendere and 24% were nol prossed or dismissed for some
other reason.' In almost all of the cases that were disposed of without
trials, there were likely negotiations of one kind or another, such as
plea bargains or exchanges of information.
Although less than one fourth of the lawyers in practice today
devote a majority of their time to litigation, and most spend none at
all in the traditional courtroom,2 there are few lawyers who do not
negotiate regularly, indeed daily, in their practice. Some lawyers who
handle little conventional litigation persist in saying that they do not
act as negotiators. If there are a few at the bar who do not, they are
rarae ayes. Patent lawyers, tax counsellors and securities specialists
and all those who perform the myriad tasks of office law practice may
not dicker about the value of a case - though some assuredly do; but
they constantly negotiate the settlement of disputed items.
Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility nor most of the
writings about lawyers' ethics specifically mention any precepts that
apply to this aspect of the profession. The few references to the law-
yer's conduct in settlement negotiations relate to obtaining client
approval3 and disclosing potentially conflicting interests.4 It is scant
comfort to observe here, as apologists for the profession usually do,
that lawyers are as honest as other men.' If it is an inevitable profes-
sional duty that they negotiate, then as professionals they can be
1. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 1973; 1974 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR-ADMINISTRATIVE OFF-
ICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS.
2. This "fact" is derived from personal observation, conversation with lawyers,
and discussions with managing partners of larger law firms, who usually report that
about 25% of their lawyers are in the litigation section.
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-7. The ABA Code, as adopted
in Louisiana, is found in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N art.
XVI, LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4, app.
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-16, 5-17.
5. Ferdinand Lunberg, quoted in M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 17
(1968).
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expected to observe something more than the morality of the market
place.
In 1969, after five years of study, the American Bar Association,
to which 192,000 of the nation's more than 300,000 lawyers belong,
adopted a Code of Professional Responsibility, superseding the
archaic Canons of Ethics. The Code has, with minor changes, been
adopted in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia.' It purports
to set forth the ethical standards that apply to the lawyer's profes-
sional conduct. It is lengthy and intricate. Its style is forbidding and
is only slightly more lucid than the more formidable parts of the
Internal Revenue Code. But its complex structure and apparent effort
to be comprehensive induce the belief that it sets forth those general
principles to which lawyers should adhere in every aspect of their
professional engagements.
Its nine canons are preceptual; they purport to state "axiomatic
norms,"' and to express "in general terms the standards of profes-
sional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession." 8 From
the Canons are derived 137 Ethical Considerations that are "aspira-
tional in character."' Both Canons and Ethical Considerations (EC)
are reinforced by 38 mandatory Disciplinary Rules (DR), each with
subparts, that set forth the sanctions for proscribed conduct. But
these scriptures contain nothing that deals directly with the propriety
of a lawyer's conduct or his ethical responsibilities when dealing as a
negotiator with another lawyer, a layman or a government agency.
Indeed, there are only a few texts that can be used to construct
precepts by analogy.
The superseded Canons of Ethics contained a fine homiletic
sentence: "The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other
lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness."1 The admo-
nitions of duty to the Court - at least in some respects - remain
explicit and elaborated in the Code; the general statement of a duty
to other lawyers no longer appears.I The Code does not speak directly
to the duty of a lawyer in dealing with laymen.
6. California adopted new Rules of Professional Conduct on January 1, 1975. They
are based in part on the Disciplinary Rules of the new code but do not include the
ethical considerations.
7. Preliminary Statement to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics No. 22 (emphasis added).
11. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-38 speaks to the lawyer's
relationship with other lawyers in litigation: "A lawyer should be courteous to opposing
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There are a few rules designed to apply to other relationships
that touch peripherally the area we are discussing. A lawyer shall not:
-knowingly make a false statement of law or fact."
-participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he
knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false."
-counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to
be illegal or fraudulent, or
-knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary
to a Disciplinary Rule. 5
-conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required
by law to reveal."
In addition, he "should be temperate and dignified and . . .
refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct."' 7 The
lawyer is admonished "to treat with consideration all persons in-
volved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless
harm.""
Taken together, these rules, interpreted in the light of that old
but ever useful candle, ejusdem generis, imply that a lawyer shall not
himself engage in illegal conduct, since the meaning of assisting a
client in fraudulent conduct is later indicated by the proscription of
other illegal conduct. As we perceive, the lawyer is forbidden to make
a false statement of law or fact knowingly. But nowhere is it ordained
that the lawyer owes any general duty of candor or fairness to mem-
bers of the bar or to laymen with whom he may deal as a negotiator,
or of honesty or of good faith insofar as that term denotes generally
scrupulous activity.
Is the lawyer-negotiator entitled, like Metternich, to depend on
"cunning, precise calculation, and a willingness to employ whatever
means justify the end of policy?"'" Few are so bold as to say so. Yet
some whose personal integrity and reputation are scrupulous have
counsel and should accede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, setting
continuances, waiver of procedural formalities and similar matters which do not preju-
dice the rights of his client." It concludes: "A lawyer should be punctual in fulfilling
all professional commitments." (Emphasis added.)
12. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrry, DR 7-102(A)(5).
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY, DR 7-102(A)(6).
14. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmLrry, DR 7-102(A)(7). Presumably this
implies, a fortiori, that a lawyer must not himself do anything fraudulent.
15. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImLrrY, DR 7-102(A)(8) (emphasis added).
16. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBIIrrY, DR 7-102(A)(3) (emphasis added).
17. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry, EC 1-5.
18. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILry, EC 7-10.
19. Lapham, The Easy Chair, HARPER'S, November, 1974, at 30.
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instructed students in negotiating tactics that appear tacitly to coun-
tenance that kind of conduct. In fairness it must be added that they
say they do not "endorse the propriety" of this kind of conduct and
indeed even indicate "grave reservations""0 about such behavior;
however, this sort of generalized disclaimer of sponsorship hardly
appears forceful enough when the tactics suggested include:
-Use two negotiators who play different roles. (Illustrated by the
"Mutt and Jeff" police technique; "Two lawyers for the same side
feign an internal dispute. .... )
-Be tough - especially against a patsy.
-Appear irrational when it seems helpful.
-Raise some of your demands as the negotiations progress.
-Claim that you do not have authority to compromise. (Empha-
sis supplied.)
-After agreement has been reached, have your client reject it
and raise his demands."
Another text used in training young lawyers commendably coun-
sels sincerity, capability, preparation, courage and flexibility. But it
also suggests "a sound set of tools or tactics and the know-how to use
(or not to use) them." One such tactic is, "Make false demands,
bluffs, threats; even use irrationality." 3
Occasionally, an experienced legal practitioner comments on the
strain the custom of the profession puts on conscience. An anonymous
but reputedly experienced Delaware lawyer is quoted as saying, "The
practice of tax law these days requires the constant taking of anti-
emetics." 4
The concern of lawyers with problems that do not ostensibly
involve either ethics or negotiations reveals assumptions regarding
what attorneys assume to be professionally proper. Thus, the Ameri-
can Bar Association suggests that a major problem is raised by the
question, "Must Attorneys Tell All to Accountants?" 5
The problem revolves around the growing demand by accoun-
20. M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY; MATERIALS FOR CLINI-
CAL LEGAL EDUCATION 232 (1974) (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 236-38. Regarding the tactic of having the client reject the agreement
and raise his demand, the authors add, "This is the most ethically dubious of the
tactics listed here, but there will be occasions where a lawyer will have to defend
against it or even to employ it." Id. at 238.
22. H. FREEMAN & H. WEIHOFER, CLINICAL LAW TRAINING 122 (1972).
23. Id.
24. Hawley, Morality v. Legality, PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 230, 235 (1956).
25. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NEWS, September, 1974, at 9.
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tants auditing corporate books that they be informed by corpo-
rate lawyers when a mutual client is facing or could be facing
contingent liabilities through involvement in potentially costly
lawsuits, possible tax claims, and so on.2"
This is not a negotiation situation, but the resistance to telling an
auditor the truth about his client's affairs arises, we are told, "be-
cause revelations could weaken cases already in court .. ."27 Since
the disclosure would certainly not be admissible in evidence, we must
assume that the apprehended "weakening" is a softening of settle-
ment posture if the real truth were told.
Honesty, as the oath administered to witnesses makes clear,
implies not only telling literal truth but also disclosing the whole
truth. The lawyer has no ethical duty to disclose information to an
adversary that may be harmful to his client's cause; most lawyers
shrink from the notion that morality requires a standard more de-
manding than duty to clients. EC 4-5 prohibits a lawyer from using
information acquired in the representation of a client to the client's
disadvantage, and this, together with the partisan nature of the law-
yer's employment, indicates to the practitioner that nondisclosure is
both a duty to the client and consistent with ethical norms.
While the lawyer who appears in court is said to owe a duty to
disclose relevant legal authorities even if they harm his client's posi-
tion, he need not disclose, and indeed most would say that he must
conceal, evidence damaging to the client's cause. This fine analysis
of what a lawyer should reveal to the judge in court doubtless inspired
the observation by the Italian jurist, Piero Calamandrei, who, in his
celebrated Eulogy of Judges, asked:
Why is it that when a judge meets a lawyer in a tram or in a caf6
and converses with him, even if they discuss a pending case, the
judge is more disposed to believe what the lawyer says than if he
said the same thing in court during the trial? Why is there greater
confidence and spiritual unity between man and man than be-
tween judge and lawyer? 8
Let us consider the proper role for a lawyer engaged in negotia-
tions when he knows that the opposing side, whether as a result of
poor legal representation or otherwise, is assuming a state of affairs
that is incorrect. Hypothesize: L., a lawyer, is negotiating the sale of
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. P. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 39 (1942).
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his client's business to another businessman, who is likewise repre-
sented by counsel. Balance sheets and profit and loss statements
prepared one month ago have been supplied. In the last month, sales
have fallen dramatically. Counsel for the potential buyer has made
no inquiry about current sales. Does L have a duty to disclose the
change in sales volume?
Some lawyers say, "I would notify my client and advise him that
he has a duty to disclose," not because of ethical considerations but
because the client's failure to do so might render the transaction
voidable if completed. If the client refused to sanction disclosure,
some of these lawyers would withdraw from representing him in this
matter on ethical grounds. As a practical matter, (i.e., to induce the
client to accept their advice) they say, in consulting with the client,
the lawyer is obliged to present the problem as one of possible fraud
in the transaction rather than of lawyers' ethics.
In typical law school fashion, let us consider another hypothet.
L, the lawyer is representing C, a client, in a suit for personal injuries.
There have been active settlement negotiations with LD, the defen-
dant's lawyer. The physician who has been treating C rendered a
written report, containing a prognosis stating that it is unlikely that
C can return to work at his former occupation. This has been fur-
nished to LD. L learns from C that he has consulted another doctor,
who has given him a new medication. C states that he is now feeling
fine and thinks he can return to work, but he is reluctant to do so
until the case is settled or tried. The next day L and LD again discuss
settlement. Does L have a duty either to guard his client's secret or
to make a full disclosure? Does he satisfy or violate either duty if,
instead of mentioning C's revelation he suggests that D require a new
medical examination? 9
Some lawyers avoid this problem by saying that it is inconceiva-
ble that a competent LD would not ask again about C's health. But
if the question as to whether L should be frank is persistently pre-
sented, few lawyers can assure that they would disclose the true facts.
Lawyers whose primary practice is corporate tend to distinguish
the two hypothets, finding a duty to disclose the downturn in earn-
ings but not the improvement in health. They may explain the dif-
ference by resorting to a discussion of the lower standards (expecta-
tions?) of the bar when engaged in personal injury litigation. "That's
why I stay away from that kind of work," one lawyer said. The esteem
29. "[Pllaintiff should disclose as much information as he possibly can without
harming his own case." H. BAER & A. BRODER, HOW TO PREPARE AND NEGOTIATE CASES
FOR SETTLEMENT 91 (1967).
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of a lawyer for his own profession must be scant if he can rationalize
the subclassifications this distinction implies. Yet this kind of grada-
tion of professional ethics appears to permeate the bar.
Lawyers from Wall Street firms say that they and their counter-
parts observe scrupulous standards, but they attribute less morality
to the personal injury lawyer, and he, in turn, will frequently point
out the inferiority of the standards of those who spend much time in
criminal litigation. The gradation of the ethics of the profession by
the area of law becomes curiouser and curiouser the more it is exam-
ined, if one may purloin the words of another venturer in wonderland.
None would apparently deny that honesty and good faith in the
sale of a house or a security implies telling the truth and not with-
holding information. But the Code does not exact that sort of integ-
rity from lawyers who engage in negotiating the compromise of a law
suit or other negotiations. Scant impetus to good faith is given by EC
7-9, which states, "When an action in the best interest of his client
seems to him to be unjust, [the lawyer] may ask his client for per-
mission to forego such action," for such a standard means that the
client sets the ultimate ethical parameter for the lawyer's conduct.
Neither is there much guidance for the negotiator in EC 7-10, "The
duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate
against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all per-
sons involved in the legal process and to avoid infliction of needless
harm." EC 7-27 also palters with the issue: "Because it interferes
with the proper administration of justice, a lawyer should not
suppress evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal
or produce." 30 In context, this obviously applies to the presentation
of evidence before a tribunal and not to out-of-court conversations.
It likewise begs our present inquiry, for the issue in regard to EC 7-
27 is whether there is a legal rather than an ethical obligation to
reveal or produce the evidence.
The professional literature contains many instances indicating
that, in the general opinion of the bar, there is no requirement that
the lawyer disclose unfavorable evidence in the usual litigious situa-
tion.31 The racontes of lawyers and judges with their peers are full of
30. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 7-27 (in pertinent part) (em-
phasis added).
31. "[Iln ordinary litigious controversy the bar has been told that it is entitled
and perhaps required to take a tough, unyielding attitude with respect to the revelation
of distasteful evidence .. " Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's Tax
Practice, 6 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 493 (1962). In a footnote, Maguire continues: "Instance
after instance can be adduced. Williston, Life and Law 271-272 (1940) (refraining from
correcting judge's statement of fact, although Mr. Williston did and his opponents did
[Vol. 35
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tales of how the other side failed to ask the one key question that
would have revealed the truth and changed the result, or how one side
cleverly avoided producing the critical document or the key witness
whom the adversary had not discovered. The feeling that, in an ad-
versary encounter, each side should develop its own case helps to
insulate counsel from considering it a duty to disclose information
unknown to the other side. Judge Marvin Frankel, an experienced
and perceptive observer of the profession, comments, "Within these
unconfining limits [of the Code] advocates freely employ time-
honored tricks and strategems to block or distort the truth.""2
The United States Supreme Court has developed a rule that
requires the disclosure by the prosecutor in a criminal case of evi-
dence favorable to the accused. But this is a duty owed by the govern-
ment as a matter of due process, not a duty of the prosecutor as a
lawyer. In all other respects in criminal cases, and in almost every
aspect of the trial of civil cases, client loyalty appears to insulate the
lawyer's conscience. Making fidelity to client the ultimate loyalty
and the client himself the authority served appears to sanction the
abdication of personal ethical responsibility, a kind of behavior de-
scribed by psychologist Stanley Milgrim in Obedience to. Authority.
He discusses a series of experiments in which people are induced to
inflict apparent physical pain on another person because someone in
authority orders it. The lawyer permits obedience to the client's inter-
est to provide the moral authority as well as the rationalized justifica-
tion for his conduct.
Do the lawyer's ethics protest more strongly against giving false
information? DR 7-102(A)(5), already quoted,3 forbids the lawyer to
"knowingly make" a false statement of law or fact. Most lawyers say
it would be improper to prepare a false document to deceive an adver-
sary or to make a factual statement known to be untrue with the
intention of deceiving him. But almost every lawyer can recount re-
peated instances where an adversary of reasonable repute dealt with
facts in such an imaginative or hyperbolic way as to make them
appear to be different from what he knew they were.
Interesting answers are obtained if lawyers are asked whether it
not know the truth); Opinion 309, NYCLA 708 (1933) (not improper to refrain from
revealing presence in court of eye witness vital to case of client's opponent, a three year
old child) .... cf. Opinion 307, NYCLA 706 (1933) (not improper to refrain from
warning witness whose testimony would be helpful to client that witness by testifying
may expose himself to prosecution)...."
32. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An Umpireal View, 30 THE RECORD OF THE
AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 21(1975).
33. See text at note 12 supra.
1975]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
is proper to make false statements that concern negotiating strategy
rather than the facts in litigation. Counsel for a plaintiff appears
quite comfortable in stating, when representing a plaintiff, "My
client won't take a penny less than $25,000," when in fact he knows
that the client will happily settle for less; counsel for the defendant
appears to have no qualms in representing that he has no authority
to settle, or that a given figure exceeds his authority, when these are
untrue statements. Many say that, as a matter of strategy, when they
attend a pre-trial conference with a judge known to press settlements,
they disclaim any settlement authority both to the judge and adver-
sary although in fact they do have settlement instructions; estimable
members of the bar support the thesis that a lawyer may not misrep-
resent a fact in controversy but may misrepresent matters that per-
tain to his authority or negotiating strategy because this is expected
by the adversary."
To most practitioners it appears that anything sanctioned by the
rules of the game is appropriate. From this point of view, negotiations
are merely, as the social scientists have viewed it, a form of game;
observance of the expected rules, not professional ethics, is the guid-
ing precept. But gamesmanship is not ethics.
Consider the problems raised when a lawyer represents a client
before a government agency, for example the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. Here special rules are thought to be applicable. A formal opinion
of the ABA Committee on Ethics states:
In practice before the Internal Revenue Service, which is itself an
adversary party rather than a judicial tribunal, the lawyer is
under a duty not to mislead the Service, either by misstatement,
silence, or through his client, but is under no duty to disclose the
weaknesses of his client's case. He must be candid and fair, and
his defense of his client must be exercised within the bounds of
the law and without resort to any manner of fraud or chicane A5
The committee states that a lawyer engaged in handling a case before
the Internal Revenue Service is not held to the principles of ethics
that would apply to litigation in court because he is dealing with the
IRS, which is the representative of one of the parties. The lawyer has
an "absolute duty not to make false assertions of fact" but this does
not "requi-e the disclosure of weaknesses in the client's case . . .
34. See, e.g., Voorhies, Law Office Training: The Art of Negotiation, 13 PRAc.
LAW., no. 4, at 61 (April, 1967).
35. AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, FORMAL OPINION 314, at 690 (April 27, 1965).
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unless the facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond reason-
able doubt that a crime will be committed. A wrong, or indeed some-
times an unjust, tax result in the settlement of a controversy is not a
crime.""6 This kind of juxtaposition of the permissible and the crimi-
nal leads inevitably to the conclusion that all that is not criminal is
acceptable.
A different distinction is drawn by Calamandrei:
The difference between the true lawyer and those men who con-
sider the law merely a trade is that the latter seek to find ways
to permit their clients to violate the moral standards of society
without overstepping the letter of the law, while the former look
for principles which will persuade their clients to keep within the
limits of the spirit of the law in common moral standards. 7
The courts have seldom had occasion to consider these ethical
problems, for disciplinary proceedings have rarely been invoked on
any charge of misconduct in the area. But where settlements have in
fact been made when one party acted on the basis of a factual error
known to the other and this error induced the compromise, courts
have set releases aside38 on the basis of mistake, or, in some cases,
fraud.
In Louisiana "fraud" is defined as "an assertion of what is false,
or a suppression of what is true. . .. " Such assertion or suppression
embraces "not only an affirmation or negation by words either writ-
ten or spoken, but any other means calculated to produce a belief of
what is false, or an ignorance or disbelief of what is true."4 This
codification is much the same as the prevailing view at common law.4
It is embraced within the concept of good faith in the negotiation and
performance of contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code.2
Obviously a contract negotiated on the basis of misrepresentation of
fact may be set aside; there is precedent, too, for invalidating the
release of a personal injury claim entered into as a result of misrepre-
sentation of matters of law. 3 These authorities fix limits on the con-
36. Id. at 691.
37. P. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES 62 (1942).
38. See, e.g., Cole v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 160 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964).
39. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1847(5).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1847(6).
41. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
42. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201, 1-203, 2-103.
43. Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 272 (1952). See also Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960). In
addition, there may be a tort claim against the person who induces the release. See
Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 500 (1958).
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duct of the principal whether he acts in person or through a lawyer.
The profession seldom confronts the necessity Vern Countryman
and Ted Finman say the attorney-at-law must consider: "the need,
if conflicting interests are to be protected, for the lawyer to serve as
a source of restraint on his client, and, indeed, on himself."" The
lawyer is a professional because his role is not merely to represent his
client as a mercenary in the client's war; he is also "a guardian of
society's interests."'
In an unpublished paper, Dean Murray L. Schwartz, of the Uni-
versity of California Law School,46 succinctly proposed three possible
standards of the relationship of the lawyer's value structure to that
of his client:
(1) A lawyer should do everything for his client that is lawful and
that the client would do for himself if he had the lawyer's skill;
(2) A lawyer need not do for his client that which the lawyer
thinks is unfair, unconscionable or over-reaching, even if lawful;
(3) A lawyer must not do for his client that which the lawyer
thinks is unfair, unconscionable or over-reaching, even if lawful.,7
"It will be giving away no professional secrets," he continues, "to
tell you that the first standard of behavior is the one that is largely
applied in a contested judicial matter." 8 He thinks that the second
standard is "officially recognized as appropriate for non-litigated
matters"49 though the authorities cited in this paper and my own
experience make me think this observation overly generous to the
profession. The third, he correctly finds, "no part of official doc-
trine." 0
A lawyer should not be restrained only by the legal inhibitions
on his client. He enjoys a monopoly on the practice of law protected
by sanctions against unauthorized practice. Through a subpart of the
profession, lawyer-educators, the lawyer controls access to legal edu-
cation. He licenses practitioners by exacting bar examinations. He
controls access to the courts save in those limited instances when a
litigant may appear pro se, and then he aptly characterizes this liti-
44. V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY 185 (1966).
45. Id. at 186.
46. M. Schwartz, Moral Development, Ethics and the Professional Education of
Lawyers, October 14, 1974 (unpublished paper on file in office of Louisiana Law
Review).
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gant as being his own lawyer, hence having a fool for his client.
The monopoly on the practice of law does not arise from the
presumed advantages of an attorney's education or social status: it
stems from the concept that, as professionals, lawyers serve society's
interests by participating in the process of achieving the just termina-
tion of disputes. That an adversary system is the basic means to this
end does not crown it with supreme value. It is means, not end."1
If he is a professional and not merely a hired, albeit skilled hand,
the lawyer is not free to do anything his client might do in the same
circumstances. The corollary of that proposition does set a minimum
standard: the lawyer must be at least as candid and honest as his
client would be required to be. The agent of the client, that is, his
attorney-at-law, must not perpetrate the kind of fraud or deception
that would vitiate a bargain if practiced by his principal. Beyond
that, the profession should embrace an affirmative ethical standard
for attorneys' professional relationships with courts, other lawyers
and the public: The lawyer must act honestly and in good faith.
Another lawyer, or a layman, who deals with a lawyer should not need
to exercise the 'same degree of caution that he would if trading for
reputedly antique copper jugs in an oriental bazaar. It is inherent in
the concept of an ethic, as a principle of good conduct, that it is
morally binding on the conscience of the professional, and not merely
a rule of the game adopted because other players observe (or fail to
adopt) the same rule. Good conduct exacts more than mere conveni-
ence. It is not sufficient to call on personal self-interest; this is the
standard created by the thesis that the same adversary met today
may be faced again tomorrow, and one had best not prejudice that
future engagement.
Patterson and Cheatham52 correctly assert that the basic stan-
dard for the negotiator is honesty. "In terms of the standards of the
profession, honesty is candor .... ,,13 Candor is not inconsistent with
striking a deal on terms favorable to the client," for it is known to
all that, at least within limits, that is the purpose to be served.
Substantial rules of law in some areas already exact of principals the
duty to perform legal obligations honestly and in good faith. Equiva-
lent standards should pervade the lawyer's professional environment.
51. For a recent illuminating reappraisal of the adversary process as a means to
truth, see Frankel, supra note 32.
52. L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAW 121 (1971).
53. Id. at 123.
54. Id.
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The distinction between honesty and good faith need not be finely
drawn here; all lawyers know that good faith requires conduct beyond
simple honesty.
Since bona fides and truthfulness do not inevitably lead to fair-
ness in negotiations, an entirely truthful lawyer might be able to
make an unconscionable deal when negotiating with a government
agency, or a layman or another attorney who is representing his own
client. Few lawyers would presently deny themselves and their clients
the privilege of driving a hard bargain against any of these adver-
saries though the opponent's ability to negotiate effectively in his own
interest may not be equal to that of the lawyer in question. The
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics does not consider it
improper for a lawyer to gain an unjust result in a tax controversy.
Young lawyers, among the most idealistic in the profession, about to
represent indigents, are advised that they be tough, especially against
a patsy. 4'
There is an occasional Micah crying in the wilderness:
One should go into conference realizing that he is an instrument
for the furtherance of justice and is under no obligation to aid his
client in obtaining an unconscionable advantage. Of course, in
the zone of doubt an attorney may and probably should get all
possible for his client."
This raises the problem inevitable in an adversary profession if
one opponent obeys a standard the other defies. As Countryman and
Finman inquire,
How is a lawyer who looks at himself as 'an instrument for the
furtherance of justice' likely to fare when pitted against an attor-
ney willing to take whatever he can get and use any means he can
get away with?"
In criminal trial matters, Brady v. Maryland57 imposes con-
straints on the prosecutor as a matter of constitutional due process
by requiring that he divulge evidence favorable to the accused. The
54.1. See text at notes 20-21, supra.
55. Herrington, Compromise v. Contest in Legal Controversies, 16 A.B.A.J. 795,
798 (1930).
56. V. COUNTRYMAN & T. FINMAN, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SocIETY 281 (1966).
See also Mathews, Negotiation: A Pedagogical Challenge, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 93, 95 (1953),
observing that in negotiation a lawyer "endowed with shrewdness and a sportive sense
of outmaneuvering his opponent" has "an opportunity to indulge his proclivity almost
devoid of risk of detection" provided he limits himself to "sharp practice" and does
not step over into fraud, coercion or violations of law "or public policy." See Note, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
57. 373 U.S. 83 (1962).
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only limitations in the Code of Professional Responsibility on sharp
practice in plea bargaining are on the public prosecutor, who
shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant. . . of
the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other gov-
ernment lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. 8
It is obvious, as has already been pointed out, that this does not stem
from an ethical standard for lawyers but on the duty of the govern-
ment, a duty the government's lawyer performs as alter ego for his
employer.
While it might strain present concepts of the role of the lawyer
in an adversary system, surely the professional standards must ulti-
mately impose upon him a duty not to accept an unconscionable deal.
While some difficulty in line-drawing is inevitable when such a dis-
tinction is sought to be made, there must be a point at which the
lawyer cannot ethically accept an arrangement that is completely
unfair to the other side, be that opponent a patsy or a tax collector.
So I posit a second precept: The lawyer may not accept a result that
is unconscionably unfair to the other party.59
A settlement that is unconscionable may result from a variety of
circumstances. There may be a vast difference in the bargaining
power of the principals so that, regardless of the adequacy of repre-
sentation by counsel, one party may simply not be able to withstand
the expense and bear the delay and uncertainty inherent in a pro-
tracted suit. There may be a vast difference in the bargaining skill
of counsel so that one is able to manipulate the other virtually at will
despite the fact that their framed certificates of admission to the bar
contain the same words.
The unconscionable result in these circumstances is in part cre-
ated by the relative power, knowledge and skill of the principals and
their negotiators. While it is the unconscionable result that is to be
avoided, the question of whether the result is indeed intolerable de-
pends in part on examination of the relative status of the parties. The
imposition of a duty to tell the truth and to bargain in good faith
would reduce their relative inequality, and tend to produce negotia-
tion results that are within relatively tolerable bounds.
But part of the test must be in result alone: whether the lesion
is so unbearable that it represents a sacrifice of value that an ethical
58. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBmrY, DR 7-103(B).
59. Compare Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
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person cannot in conscience impose upon another. The civil law has
long had a principle that a sale of land would be set aside if made
for less than half its value, regardless of circumstance." This doc-
trine, called lesion beyond moiety, looks purely to result. If the pro-
fessional ethic is caveat negotiator, then we could not tolerate such a
burden. But there certainly comes a time when a deal is too good to
be true, where what has been accomplished passes the line of simply-
a-good-deal and becomes a cheat.
The lawyer should not be free to negotiate an unconscionable
result, however pleasing to his client, merely because it is possible,
any more than he is free to do other reprobated acts. He is not to
commit perjury or pay a bribe or give advice about how to commit
embezzlement. These examples refer to advice concerning illegal con-
duct, but we do already, in at least some instances, accept the princi-
ple that some acts are proscribed though not criminal: the lawyer is
forbidden to testify as a witness in his client's cause,"1 or to assert a
defense merely to harass his opponent; 2 he is enjoined to point out
to his client "those factors that may lead to a decision that is morally
just. '6 3 Whether a mode of conduct available to the lawyer is illegal
or merely unconscionably unfair, the attorney must refuse to partici-
pate. This duty of fairness is one owed to the profession and to so-
ciety; it must supersede any duty owed to the client.
One who has actively practiced law for over 20 years and been a
federal trial judge for eight years knows that the theses he has set
forth are vulnerable to charges that they are impractical, visionary,
or radical. Old friends will shake their heads and say that years on
the bench tend to addle brains and lead to doddering homilies.
But, like other lawyers, judges hear not only of the low repute
the public has for the bench but also of the even lower regard it has
for the bar. We have been told so in innumerable speeches but, more
important, our friends, neighbors and acquaintances tell us on every
hand that they think little of the morality of our profession. They like
us; indeed some of their best friends are lawyers. But they deplore
the conduct of our colleagues. This is not merely an aftermath of
Watergate: it is, in major part, because many members of the public,
not without some support in the facts, view our profession as one that
adopts ethics as cant, pays lip service to DR's and on behalf of clients
stoops to almost any chicane that is not patently unlawful. We will
60. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589.
61. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-102(A). See also EC 5-9, DR
5-101(B).
62. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmrrY, DR 7-102(A)(1).
63. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, EC 7-8.
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not change that attitude by Law Days alone. It is to serve society's
needs that professions are licensed and the unlicensed prohibited
from performing professional functions. It is inherent in the concept
of professionalism that the profession will regulate itself, adhering to
an ethos that imposes standards higher than mere law observance.
Client avarice and hostility neither control the lawyer's conscience
nor measure his ethics. Surely if its practitioners are principled, a
profession that dominates the legal process in our law-oriented so-
ciety would not expect too much if it required its members to adhere
to two simple principles when they negotiate as professionals: Negoti-
ate honestly and in good faith; and do not take unfair advantage of
another - regardless of his relative expertise or sophistication. This
is inherent in the oath the ABA recommends be taken by all who are
admitted to the bar: "I will employ for the purpose of maintaining
the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor. 6
4
64. Oath of Admission recommended by ABA, modeled after the one in use in the
State of Washington.
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